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ABSTRACT 
 
As the United States becomes increasingly dependent 
on universal, high-speed wireless services, infrastructural 
limitations are producing tension. The interests of 
consumers, telecommunications companies, state and local 
authorities, and businesses, as well as national security, 
are all at stake. Yet legal uncertainty stemming from a split 
among federal circuit courts hampers the development of 
solutions. The courts diverge on the interpretation of a key 
provision of the Telecommunications Act (TCA), 47 U.S.C. 
§ 332(c)(7)(B), that regulates wireless service providers’ 
ability to erect new towers. There is great need for a 
national standard to give mobile providers a uniform 
means of accommodating growing demand. Without such a 
standard, courts apply the TCA incongruently, affecting 
consumers and providers alike and ultimately impacting 
critical infrastructure. The Federal Communications 
Commission or Congress should set a uniform standard, 
rather than relying on the courts to confront the issue 
unevenly on a case-by-case basis.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Today’s mobile phones are revolutionizing the way we live:  
from our phones we can summon street views of towns across the 
globe, turn off the lights in our homes while sitting in an airport 
lounge, or broadcast a television show from the previous night 
while commuting by train. The advanced data-transmitting 
technology that powers this revolution depends on the availability 
of massive bands of radiofrequency waves, collectively referred to 
as “spectrum,” for its survival. 
Demand for data is rapidly increasing. Approximately 88% of 
adults in the United States—some 315.5 million people—subscribe 
to mobile services.1 As of 2011, nearly one-third of U.S. 
households use mobile phones instead of landlines for voice 
access.2 Moreover, approximately 17% of mobile phone users rely 
1 Lee Rainie, The State of Mobile Connectivity, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE 
PROJECT (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
Presentations/2012/Aug/The-State-of-Mobile-Connectivity.aspx. 
2 Stephen J. Blumberg & Julian V. Luke, Wireless Substitution: Early 
Release of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, January–June 
2011, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS AT THE CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/ 
wireless201112.pdf.  
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on their phones for primary access to the Internet.3 "Annual 
investment in U.S. wireless services grew more than 40% between 
2009 and 2012, to $30 billion from $21 billion, and is projected to 
rise to $35 billion in 2013."4 
Towers communicate with wireless devices through 
radiofrequency waves.5  Radiofrequency spectrum, as regulated, is 
a finite resource, and it has become increasingly scarce.6 The 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) estimates that 
demand for spectrum will soon be greater than supply.7 The FCC 
is actively working to solve this dilemma, recently issuing a notice 
of proposed rulemaking that would provide greater spectrum to 
3 Aaron Smith, Cell Internet Use, PEW INTERNET AND AM. LIFE PROJECT 
(June 26, 2012), available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Cell-Internet-
Use-2012.aspx. 
4 Office of the Press Sec'y, Exec. Office of the President, Fact Sheet: 
Administration Provides Another Boost to Wireless Broadband and 
Technological Innovation, (June 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/spectrum_fact_sheet_final.pdf 
(determining that the U.S. wireless broadband industry contributes more than 
$150 billion in GDP annually). 
5 Office of the Press Sec'y, Exec. Office of the President. Fact Sheet: 
Doubling the Amount of Commercial Spectrum to Unleash the Innovative 
Potential of Wireless Broadband (Jun. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-doubling-amount-
commercial-spectrum-unleash-innovative-potential-wireles. 
6 Id. (“As the revolution in mobile broadband and related technologies 
unfolds, the demand for spectrum will continue to increase—leading to 
increasing fears of a “spectrum crunch” . . . Mobile broadband technologies 
enable consumers and businesses to access unprecedented amounts of voice, 
data, and video applications through wireless networks. Demand for commercial 
wireless data services that are secure and reliable is expected to increase 
exponentially in the next decade as new services and technologies develop.”).    
7 See Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Federal Commc’n Comm’n, 
Speaking at International Consumer Electronics Association (Jan. 9, 2013) (“We 
predict a WiFi traffic jam and we need to fix it . . . WiFi is such an integral part 
of our broadband ecosystem, that we need to make sure we pay it sufficient 
attention."), available at http://www.wirelessweek.com/news/2013/01/fcc-
move-better-wi-fi; Randall Stephenson, Op-Ed., Spectrum and the Wireless 
Revolution, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2012, at A3 (“If [excess demand] happens, the 
speed of the mobile revolution will slow down. Prices, download times and 
consumer frustration will all increase. And at a societal level we risk 
jeopardizing the future of our nation’s vital mobile Internet infrastructure, which 
is generating jobs and investment . . . .”). 
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unlicensed devices, including smartphones, tablets, and similar 
personal wireless devices.8 Additionally, President Barack Obama 
issued a memorandum encouraging agencies that have previously 
utilized spectrum for federal use to implement policies where they 
share access with commercial companies.9 
While the availability of spectrum is a critical and well-
recognized component of mobile wireless broadband,10 the 
proximity of towers to customers is also essential to the provision 
of quality service.11 Yet local communities are reluctant to allow 
more towers in their neighborhoods.  Consequently, local and state 
governments are squeezed to make these critical infrastructure 
decisions.12 
Tension is building as demand grows for reliable, fast, and 
ubiquitous service, and mobile providers are vying to meet this 
demand before their competitors. Telecommunications companies’ 
key to market competitiveness is provision of coast-to-coast 
8 Press Release, Federal Commc’n Comm’n, Statement of FCC Chairman 
Julius Genachowski on Incentive Auction Proposal (Sept. 7, 2012), available at 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0907/DOC-
316148A1.pdf (“In freeing up spectrum for wireless broadband, incentive 
auctions will drive faster speeds, greater capacity, and ubiquitous mobile 
coverage. These are essential ingredients for innovation and leadership in the 
21st century economy where smartphones and tablets powered by 4G LTE and 
Wi-Fi networks are proliferating, and the mobile Internet becomes more 
important every day. Over the last few years, the U.S. has regained global 
leadership in mobile innovation -- and we must not let up now."); see also Press 
Release, Federal Commc’n Comm’n, Increased Spectrum Available for 
Unlicensed Devices in the 5 GHz Band (Feb. 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/document/increased-spectrum-available-unlicensed-devices-
5-ghz-band. 
9 Expanding America's Leadership in Wireless Innovation, 78 Fed. Reg. 
37,431 (June 14, 2013) (advocating for eliminating sharing restrictions between 
commercial carriers and federal agencies).  
10 National Broadband Plan, Executive Summary, Federal Commc’n 
Comm’n, available at http://www.broadband.gov/plan/executive-summary/ (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
11 Types of Broadband Connections, Federal Commc’n Comm’n, available 
at http://www.broadband.gov/broadband_types.html#wireless (last visited Oct. 
20, 2013).  
12  See Gregory Tan, Wading Through the Rhetoric of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Uncertainty of Local Zoning Authority over 
Wireless Telecommunications Tower Siting, 22 VT. L. REV. 461, 461 (1997).  
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nationwide coverage, reaching even the most rural regions, at the 
highest speeds available.13  However, telecommunications 
companies looking to build new towers or devices to create or 
improve such a nationwide network are governed, and in some 
cases thwarted, by the regulations stipulated in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA).14 
The TCA preserves local authority over the location and 
construction of wireless communication facilities, with certain 
exceptions. Section 332(c)(7)(B) provides that a state or local 
government shall not “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the 
provision of personal wireless services” by “regulation of the 
placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless 
services.”15 A circuit split has developed as courts have decided 
which types of government actions are appropriately labeled 
“effective prohibition.”16  
First, courts are split over whether the denial of one provider’s 
application to erect a new tower constitutes effective prohibition 
under the TCA.17 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in AT&T 
Wireless PCS v. City Council of Virginia Beach read the statute to 
mean that only blanket bans or general bans that affect all 
13 See, e.g., Theresa Howard, ‘Can you hear me now?’ a Hit, USA TODAY 
(Feb. 23, 2004, 8:14 A.M.), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money 
/advertising/adtrack/2004-02-22-track-verizon_x.htm (explaining that 
network reliability grew to become a customer priority and that Verizon’s 
marketing campaign showing Verizon workers in the middle of wheat fields and 
snowy mountains receiving strong cellular signal helped Verizon increase its net 
customers by 10% in the first two years of its campaign).  
14 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2006). 
15 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B).  
16 Compare AT&T Wireless PCS v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 
F.3d 423, 428 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that only blanket bans or general 
prohibitions on all providers constitute effective prohibition) with Second 
Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 627 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(explaining that if a local government’s decision to restrict one wireless 
provider’s access to build or modify a wireless communication facility, that in 
consequence, effectively prohibits wireless services, and then the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution requires that the local government’s authority be 
preempted by the TCA’s policy goals). 
17 See T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Charter Twp. of West Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 
794, 797 (6th Cir. 2012); Metro PCS v. City & Cnty of San Francisco, 400 
F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2005); AT&T Wireless, 155 F.3d 423. 
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providers qualify as effective prohibition.18 On the other hand, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Metro PCS v. City & County of 
San Francisco and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in T-Mobile 
Central, LLC v. Charter Township of West Bloomfield rejected the 
Fourth Circuit’s narrow reading and held that denial of a single 
provider’s application violates the TCA.19 
Most courts have expanded their analysis of effective 
prohibition beyond the question of whether there is a ban on all 
providers, focusing their analyses on individual wireless providers. 
In doing so, the courts have established a two-pronged test to 
determine whether the denial of a company’s application 
constitutes an effective prohibition, asking (1) whether there is a 
significant gap in coverage, and (2) whether filling that gap is 
necessary and all other options have been thoroughly exhausted.20 
Courts have considered whether a state or local government can 
still violate the TCA in the absence of a general prohibition by 
preventing a wireless provider from closing a significant gap in 
coverage. However, courts vary on the interpretation of the term 
“significant gap,” disagreeing on whether it refers to one 
provider’s coverage, or all available coverage. 
The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits have adopted the “one-
provider rule,” under which there is not a significant gap in a 
particular area if at least one provider serves that area.21  
Conversely, the First Circuit, in Second Generation Props., L.P. v. 
Town of Pelham, and the Ninth Circuit, in MetroPCS, both rejected 
the one-provider rule and adopted a multiple-provider rule that 
evaluates each provider independently to determine whether each 
has a coverage gap in the area.22 In 2009, the FCC weighed in on 
18 See AT&T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 428. 
19 See T-Mobile, 691 F.3d at 803; Metro PCS, 400 F.3d at 730. 
20 See MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 731; see also T-Mobile, 691 F.3d at 804; see 
generally Robert B. Foster, The Better Part of Valor is Co-Location: Recent 
Developments in Judicial Review of Land Use Regulation of Cellular 
Telecommunications Facilities under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 42 
URB. LAW. 595, 595 (2010). 
21 See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643 (2d Cir. 1999); 
APT Pittsburgh LTD v. Penn Twp. Butler Cnty of Pa., 196 F.3d 469, 478 (3d 
Cir. 1999); AT&T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 428. 
22 See Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 
634 (1st Cir. 2002); MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 733. 
                                                 
6
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol9/iss2/5
2013] CAN YOU HEAR ME NOW? 121 
this issue, adopting the latter approach.23 In August 2012, the Sixth 
Circuit, in T-Mobile Central, joined the latter camp.24 
Once the court determines that there is a significant gap, the 
second prong of the test requires that providers demonstrate both 
the need to close the gap and evidence that there is no other 
feasible location to erect the facility. Again, the circuits have 
interpreted this provision differently. The Second, Third, Sixth, 
and Ninth Circuits have adopted a standard that requires the 
provider to demonstrate that the proposed means for closing the 
gap—most commonly, a new wireless tower—is the “least 
intrusive” means; that is, the provider must show that it has 
considered other locations, system designs, and tower designs.25 
The First and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, require simply 
that the provider show there are no other viable alternatives.26 
As a result of these divisions, telecommunications companies’ 
market access and ability to expand infrastructure is greater in 
some circuits than in others. This creates a quandary for wireless 
providers seeking to meet increasing mobile data demand, which 
affects not only consumers but even national security.27 As 
President Obama has argued, high-speed wireless access is 
essential to developing a technologically advanced twenty-first 
century society that is connected at all times.28 As we become so 
23 See In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Section 
332(c)(7)(B), 24 F.C.C.R. 13994, ¶ 57 (2009).   
24 See T-Mobile, 691 F.3d at 804. 
25 See id. at 808; Metro PCS, 400 F.3d at 734; Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643; 
Penn Twp., 196 F.3d at 480. 
26 See VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix Cnty, 342 F.3d 818, 834–
5 (7th Cir. 2003); Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 635.  
27 See generally Steven J. Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, 
Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 446 
(2005).  
28 President Barack Obama, Opening Remarks at the White House Rural 
Economic Forum (Aug. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/08/16/opening-remarks-president-white-house-rural-
economic-forum (“[J]ust as the interstate highways knitted the country together 
50 years ago, we’ve also got to do some new things to meet the challenges of the 
21st century. We need to expand the reach of broadband, high-speed Internet, to 
7 million more people and hundreds of thousands of businesses in rural 
communities . . . It’s helping people sell goods, not just down the street but 
across the country and around the world.”).  
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intensely dependent on wireless infrastructure,29 an inconsistent 
and ambiguous approach does not further the best interests of the 
United States or its people. 
This Article will first outline the applicable TCA provision and 
its legislative history, as well as FCC orders to discern 
Congressional intent in drafting the TCA. Next, the Article will 
analyze the TCA in light of the circuit splits to find the source of 
the conflicting holdings and the ways in which courts have 
interpreted the TCA provision. Finally, this Article will explore the 
stakes of the circuit split and the myriad ways the split is impacting 
the United States, its citizens, and its telecommunications 
providers. 
 
I. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 
 
A. The Act 
 
In 1996, President William J. Clinton signed the TCA,30 
celebrating the monumental event as exemplary of his “promise to 
reform our telecommunications laws in a manner that leads to 
competition and private investment, promotes universal service 
and open access to information networks, and provides for flexible 
government regulation.”31  
Section 704(c)(7) of the TCA,32 entitled “Preservation of local 
zoning authority,” added a new provision to section 332 of the 
29 Critical Infrastructure Protection, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347 (July 17, 1996) 
(emphasizing that “[c]ertain national infrastructures are so vital that their 
incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or 
economic security of the United States.  These critical infrastructures include 
telecommunications . . . .”).   
30 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 
(1996), codified 47 U.S.C. § 332. 
31 President’s Statement on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(February 8, 1996), reprinted in 3 Federal Telecommunications Law: A 
Legislative History of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, doc. 95, at 208 
(B.D. Reams, Jr. & W.H Man zeds., 1997) (“The Telecommunications Act of 
1996 will strengthen our economy, our society, our families, and our democracy.  
It promotes competition as the key to opening new markets and new 
opportunities.  It will protect consumers by regulating the remaining monopolies 
for a time and by providing a roadmap for deregulation in the future.”). 
32 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7). 
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Communications Act of 1984. It provided that local or state 
government must not interfere with “the placement, construction, 
and modification of personal wireless services” and any regulation 
cannot “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting” such services.33 
This language maintained local governments’ decision-making 
authority, except where decisions pertain to “the placement, 
construction, and modification of personal wireless service 
facilities.”34 It also created new limitations by placing a 
substantive restriction on state and local decisions such that they 
may not effectively prohibit personal wireless services.35 Finally, 
the amendment provided for judicial review of decisions—any 
person adversely affected by state or local authorities may bring 
action in federal or state court.36   
As the following sections will explore, the ambiguity of this 
substantive limitation has produced considerable discord among 
the courts. While the FCC has presumed authority to resolve one 
aspect of the issue—how to define effective prohibition—the 
agency has not clarified the application of the provision in its 
entirety, giving the courts leeway, but also an obligation, to create 
and apply their own standards and tests. 
 
B. The Legislative History 
 
In enacting the TCA, Congress sought to provide “a pro-
competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to 
rapidly accelerate private sector deployment of advanced 
telecommunications and information technologies and services to 
all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to 
competition.”37 Policy objectives underlying the TCA included 
both reducing regulation to increase competition—incentivizing 
33 Id.; see also THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 LAW AND 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 58 (Robert E. Emeritz et al. eds., 1996) (concluding that 
state and local governments are limited in their authority to regulate because 
they cannot unreasonably discriminate and cannot, explicitly or implicitly, 
effectively prohibit wireless services).  
34 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A). 
35 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). 
36 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). 
37 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996) reprinted in 1996 U.S. Code Cong. 
& Admin. News 10, 1124. 
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lower prices and higher quality services38—and preserving local 
authority to govern and regulate.39 These two policy goals are in an 
enduring tension under the current framework, laying the 
foundation for dissonant interpretations among the courts.40 
However, the legislative history unambiguously shows that 
Congress intended the effective prohibition provision to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis, not to establish a general, blanket 
rule.41 The FCC issued a ruling in 2009 interpreting the plain 
language of the TCA as following the multiple-provider rule, and 
determining that any other interpretation would be in violation of 
the TCA’s pro-competitive purpose.42 The agency submitted that 
its interpretation aligned with the basic goals of the TCA—“to 
improve service quality and lower prices for consumers.”43  But the 
difficulty did not end there. Once this issue was resolved, the 
courts created a two-pronged test to further determine when a 
provider’s application could be denied. Courts have interpreted this 
test in varying ways.  
 
38 S. Rep. No. 104-23, Purpose of the Bill (1995), reprinted in 1 Federal 
Telecommunications Law, at 1; H.R. Rep. No. 104-204, Purpose and Summary 
(1995), reprinted in 1 Federal Telecommunications Law, at 47–50. 
39 See S.652 CRS Summary H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996). 
40 See ATC Realty v. Town of Kingston, 303 F.3d 91, 94 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(explaining that the TCA “works like a scale that, inter alia, attempts to balance 
two objects of competing weight:  on one arm sits the need to accelerate the 
deployment of telecommunications technology, while on the other arm rests the 
desire to preserve state and local control over zoning matters.”). 
41 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News 202, 222 (“Actions taken by State or local governments 
shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the placement, construction or 
modification of personal wireless services.  It is the intent of this section that 
bans or policies that have the effect of banning personal wireless services or 
facilities not be allowed and that decisions be made on a case-by-case basis.”); 
see also President’s Statement on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(February 8, 1996), reprinted in 3 Federal Telecommunications Law: A 
Legislative History of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, doc. 95, at 208 
(B.D. Reams, Jr. & W.H Man zeds., 1997) (emphasizing that the TCA was 
created to promote and protect universal wireless services competition).   
42 In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Section 
332(c)(7)(B), 24 F.C.C.R. 13994, ¶ 58–61 (2009). 
43 Id. 
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
 Since 1996, various wireless providers have brought 
actions challenging local authority to deny their applications for 
new wireless facilities. In deciding these cases, courts have looked 
to the TCA’s underlying policies.44 Essentially, the courts have 
had to determine how broadly Congress intended to preempt state 
and local authority.45 That is, they have had to determine whether 
denying a service provider’s application to place, construct, or 
modify a tower violates § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) of the TCA46 by 
effectively prohibiting personal wireless services, and whether 
Congress intended this provision to be applied on a case-by-case 
basis or to create a general prohibition. This has taken the form of 
a two-pronged test to determine whether the denial of a company’s 
application constitutes an effective prohibition: first, there must be 
a “significant gap” in coverage; and second, the proposed plan to 
address that gap must be necessary to achieve the desired 
coverage.47 
 
44 Robert B. Foster, The Better Part of Valor is Co-Location: Recent 
Developments in Judicial Review of Land Use Regulation of Cellular 
Telecommunications Facilities under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 42 
URB. LAW. 595, 595 (Summer 2010) (“[C]ourts have worked to harmonize 
Congress’s ‘two sometimes contradictory purposes’ in enacting the Act: to 
promote competition and reduce regulation in order to accelerate the deployment 
of telecommunications technology while also preserving state and local control 
over land use matters.”). 
45 See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of City of Virginia Beach, 
979 F.Supp. 416, 426 (E.D. Va. 1997) aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. 
AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of City of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 
423 (4th Cir. 1998). 
46 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).   
47 See MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 731; see also T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Charter 
Tp. of West Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794, 806 (6th Cir. 2012).  See generally Robert 
B. Foster, The Better Part of Valor is Co-Location:  Recent Developments in 
Judicial Review of Land Use Regulation of Cellular Telecommunications 
Facilities under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 42 URB. LAW. 595, 595 
(2010). 
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A. Showing a “Significant Gap” in Coverage 
 
The first portion of the analysis concerns whether there is a 
significant gap in coverage in the area. Because the TCA does not 
define “significant gap,” the courts have wrestled with its 
meaning.48 Two distinct judicial standards have emerged for 
evaluating coverage gaps in the context of effective prohibition: 
the “one-provider rule” and the “multiple-provider rule.” 
 
1. The “One-Provider Rule” 
 
Under the one-provider rule, if at least one company provides 
coverage for an area, there is no significant gap in coverage and a 
state or local government may preclude other companies from 
providing coverage in that area.49 In AT&T, the City Council of 
Virginia Beach denied AT&T’s application to construct two new 
towers on a church in a wooded area where signals were weak.50 
The district court evaluated legislative history and determined that 
the TCA provision grants local governments the authority to 
decline applications even if doing so excludes competitors.51 On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit looked to the plain meaning of the 
48 See, e.g., Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 
620, 631 (1st Cir. 2002) (distinguishing between a geographic gap that is not 
served by any carrier and a dead spot that is statutorily permissible because even 
reliable coverage will have areas of weakness, and acknowledging that parties 
are using the definition of significant gap to address a “qualitatively different 
and much more complex set of problems”); see also 360 degrees 
Communications Co. of Charlottesville v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Albemarle County, 
211 F.3d 79, 87 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding the varying definitions of “significant 
gap” divined by various circuit courts are unhelpful in determining whether the 
TCA has been violated). 
49 See MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 731 (barring other violations, e.g., of zoning 
laws and of other provisions of the TCA). 
50 AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of City of Virginia Beach, 979 
F.Supp. 416, 420 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
51 Id. at 426 (granting the City Council summary judgment because 
Congress only intended to prohibit general bans and AT&T failed to 
demonstrate that denial of its application was a general ban) (citing H.R. Conf. 
Rep. No 104-458, 104th Conf., 2d Sess. 208 (1996), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 124, 
222). 
                                                 
12
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol9/iss2/5
2013] CAN YOU HEAR ME NOW? 127 
phrase “significant gap” and arrived at the same conclusion.52 The 
Fourth Circuit was joined by the Second and Third circuits in 
adopting the one-provider rule.53 Some courts reasoned that the 
one-provider rule promotes the regulatory efforts of the TCA to 
establish nationwide cellular coverage.54 
 
2. The “Multiple-Provider Rule” 
 
The First Circuit, in Second Generation; the Ninth Circuit, in 
MetroPCS; and the Sixth Circuit, in T-Mobile Central, rejected a 
narrow reading of the TCA and held that a state or local 
government that denies one provider’s application effectively 
prohibits personal wireless services generally.55 
In Second Generation, the provider planned to build a tower on 
52 AT&T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 424 (recognizing that even without 
beginning with a legislative history statutory analysis as the lower court did, the 
statute clearly reads that blanket bans on all providers constitute effective 
prohibition and such a reading follows the TCA’s goal of promoting 
competition). 
53 See Omnipoint Commc’n Enter., L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Easttown 
Twp., 331 F.3d 386, 398 (3d Cir. 2003); Nextel W. Corp. v. Unity Twp., 282 
F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2002) (requiring that for a provider to demonstrate a 
significant gap, the gap must be “from a user's perspective, rather than a 
particular provider's perspective”); Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 
630, 640-1 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[c]onstruing subsection B(i)(II) to apply only to 
general bans would lead to the conclusion that in the absence of an explicit anti-
tower policy, a court would have to wait for a series of denied applications 
before it could step in and force a local government to end its illegal boycott of 
personal wireless services”); APT Pittsburgh LTD v. Penn Twp. Butler Cnty of 
Pa., 196 F.3d 469, 478 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Interpreting the TCA’s ‘effect of 
prohibiting’ clause to encompass every individual zoning denial simply because 
it has the effect of precluding a specific provider from providing wireless 
services, however, would give the TCA preemptive effect well beyond what 
Congress intended.”). 
54 See Omnipoint, 331 F.3d at 400 (reasoning that when one provider enters 
an area of service, the provisions of the TCA “work together to promote the 
expansion of wireless telcommunications networks”) (citing Unity Township, 
282 F.3d at 264 n.6).   
55 See T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Charter Twp. Of West Bloomfield, 691 F.3d. 
at 808-09; MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 733; Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town 
of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 634 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The fact that some carrier 
provides some service to some consumers does not in itself mean that the town 
has not effectively prohibited services to other consumers.”).   
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its ninety acres of land situated atop a heavily wooded area along a 
highway in New Hampshire.56 After the township denied the 
Second Generation’s application twice, the company filed suit 
alleging that the local authorities were violating the TCA by 
effectively prohibiting personal wireless services.57 Similarly, in 
MetroPCS, the San Francisco planning commission denied the 
provider’s application to install six panels above a garage to 
ameliorate allegedly poor service in the area.58 The courts in both 
cases reasoned that the denial of one application could qualify as 
effective prohibition when a significant gap in coverage exists and 
alternative solutions to resolving the gap have been exhausted.59 
In MetroPCS, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the language of the 
TCA with a more discriminating inquiry.60 The court determined 
that MetroPCS had not sufficiently demonstrated the need for a 
new tower.61 Meanwhile, the T-Mobile court noted that a party 
need not show a significant gap in coverage by gathering 
complaints from customers, but could instead provide the court 
with technical evidence.62 
In Second Generation, the First Circuit reasoned that if a local 
law or regulation prevented a wireless provider from resolving a 
significant gap in its own service, then it was effectively 
prohibiting wireless services.63 The court argued that a multiple-
provider approach serves both the interests of consumers and the 
TCA’s underlying regulatory goal “to secure lower prices and 
56 Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 624.  
57 Id. at 624–5.  
58 MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 718–9.  
59 Id. at 731; Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 634.  
60 See MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 731 (considering not only whether the TCA 
was meant to prohibit general bans, but also whether a locality can violate the 
TCA’s “effective prohibition” provision if it denies a wireless provider with the 
means for closing a “significant gap” in its own coverage).   
61 Id. at 733 (“[T]he record is replete with contradictory allegations as to 
MetroPCS’s need for the Geary site.”).   
62 T-Mobile, 2012 WL 3570666, at *11 (assessing that “RF propagation 
maps and drive test data, along with a report by an RF engineer” are suitable for 
providing evidence of a significant gap). 
63 Second Generation, 313 F.3d 620, 634 (1st Cir. 2002) (highlighting that 
Congress used “services” not “service” in its construction of section 
332(c)(7)(B), thus insinuating that Congress considered multiple carriers, not 
one carrier, to serve a particular area).   
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better service for consumers by opening all telecommunications 
markets to competition.”64 
Nonetheless, courts in both the one-provider and multiple-
provider camps agree that “significant gap” refers to gaps that are 
truly significant,65 and federal regulations confirm this 
understanding.66 In 2009, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling 
endorsing the multiple-provider rule and seemingly resolving the 
significant gap conflict.67  However, the split over the second 
prong of the test, which requires providers to demonstrate the 
necessity and feasibility of alternative locations, remains 
unresolved. 
 
B. Showing Necessity 
 
Once a wireless provider successfully demonstrates that a 
significant gap exists, the provider must establish the necessity of 
closing the particular gap and the degree of intrusiveness of the 
64 H.R. Rep. No. 104 204, Purpose and Summary (1995), reprinted in 1 
Federal Telecommunications Law, at 47–50 (determining the absence of 
effective prohibition from the mere fact that one service provider is in an area 
would allow a locality to deny as many providers as it wishes, which fails to 
serve the consumer’s interest, and establishes the foundation for not only 
sporadic coverage, but also for promoting a one provider industry contrary to the 
Act that Congress enacted to promote competition).  
65 See MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 733-4 (clarifying that the TCA does not 
guarantee wireless providers with the right to cover every city block within a 
covered area, making this inquiry fact specific); Sprint Spectrum, L.P., v. 
Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643–4 (recognizing that there will inevitably be certain 
areas within a building, for example, that will not have service, but because this 
lack of service is de minimis, denying a provider from constructing an additional 
tower to meet this demand does not constitute effective prohibition). 
66 See 47 C.F.R. § 22.99 (2001) (defining areas with significant gaps in 
coverage as “[s]mall areas within a service area where the field strength is lower 
than the minimum level for reliable service”). 
67 See In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Section 
332(c)(7)(B), 24 F.C.C.R. 13994, ¶ 56–7 (2009) available at 
http://www.ct.gov/csc/lib/csc/fcc/fcc-09-99a1.pdf (“We conclude that State or 
local government that denies an application for personal wireless service 
facilities citing solely because ‘one or more carriers serve a given geographic 
market’ has engaged in unlawful regulation . . . any other interpretation of this 
provision would be inconsistent with the Telecommunications Act’s pro-
competitive purpose . . . .”).   
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proposed means.68 The Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth circuits 
have adopted a standard that requires a showing that the proposal 
is the “least intrusive” means.69 The First and Seventh circuits 
require instead that the provider show there are no other viable 
alternatives to the proposed plan.70   
 
1. The “Least Intrusive” Standard 
 
In MetroPCS, the Ninth Circuit recognized the competing 
methods that other circuits have utilized to determine the requisite 
showing.71 The court reasoned that considering the most 
acceptable option would be too subjective, while requiring there be 
no other options was unrealistically stringent.72 Thus, the court 
concluded the “least intrusive” standard was best for both the local 
ordinances as well as for the providers.73 Similarly, in T-Mobile 
68 See MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 734.  
69 See T-Mobile Cent.,LLC, 691 F.3d at 808; MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 734; 
Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643; APT Pittsburgh LTD v. Penn Twp. Butler Cnty of Pa., 
196 F.3d 469, 480 (3d Cir. 1999). 
70 See Voicestream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix Cnty, 342 F.3d 818, 834–
5 (7th Cir. 2003); Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 
620, 635 (1st Cir. 2002) 
71 MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 734 (finding that “the district court attempted to 
reconcile competing interpretations of the intrusiveness inquiry by creating its 
own ‘fact-based test that requires the provider to demonstrate that its proposed 
solution is the most acceptable option for the community in question’” (citing 
MetroPCS, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2003) 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded sub nom. MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & 
County of San Francisco, 400 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2005))).  Compare Penn Twp. 
196 F.3d at 480 (requiring the provider to show that “the manner in which it 
proposes to fill the significant gap in service is the least intrusive on the values 
that the denial sought to serve.”), with Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 635 
(requiring providers to show there are “no alternative sites which would solve 
the problem.”). 
72 MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 734 (comparing that the district court’s “most 
acceptable option” was counterintuitive because providers would not be able to 
overcome this subjective standard, especially when a proposal had already been 
denied for that location, while the “only viable option” standard would 
ultimately prevent any facility from being built since no one spot would ever be 
the “only” option available, thus wasting the time and resources of both wireless 
companies and local governments). 
73 Id. at 734–5 (positing that the least intrusive standard encourages 
providers to select the least intrusive site in their first application, “and it 
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the Sixth Circuit adopted the least intrusive standard for its 
flexibility, and held that T-Mobile had made the requisite showing 
of necessity and alternate options because it made good faith 
attempts at identifying alternative locations.74 
 
2. The “No Viable Alternatives” Standard 
 
In Second Generation, the First Circuit reasoned the provider 
failed to meet its burden of showing the significant gap in coverage 
could not be resolved by other means because Second Generation 
had not yet determined whether other possible solutions were 
infeasible.75 Similarly, in VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. 
Croix County, the Seventh Circuit held that to meet the second 
prong of the two-part test, the wireless provider must show “there 
are no other potential solutions to the purported problem.”76 The 
court did not find that VoiceStream’s efforts met its heavy burden 
to demonstrate that its proposal was “the only feasible plan for 
closing the gap” because it did not thoroughly pursue alternative 
arrangements.77 
promises to ultimately identify the best solution for the community, not merely 
the last one remaining after a series of application denials.”). 
74 T-Mobile, 691 F.3d at 808 (explaining that with a “no viable alternatives” 
standard, wireless providers could “endlessly have to search for different, 
marginally better alternatives,” whereas the least intrusive standard is 
“straightforward”) (citing Omnipoint, 331 F.3d at 398 (noting the least intrusive 
standard “will require a showing that good faith effort has been made to identify 
and evaluate less intrusive alternative system designs, alternative tower designs, 
placement of antennae on existing structures, etc.”)).   
75 Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 635 (finding Second Generation “failed 
to show that a taller tower . . . could not be built in the Overlay Zone to remedy 
the alleged gap.  Nor did it show that no other feasible sites existed outside of 
the Overlay Zone . . . also failed to explore whether existing towers in nearby 
jurisdictions . . . could provide other carriers with coverage in the purported 
gap.”).   
76 VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix Cnty, 342 F.3d 818, 834 
(citing Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 629) (concluding that, “so long as the 
service provider has not investigated thoroughly the possibility of other viable 
alternatives, the denial of an individual permit does not ‘prohibit or have the 
effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.’”).   
77 Id. at 836 (“Although VoiceStream provided extensive maps, diagrams, 
environmental assessments and historic assessments for the Somerset site, 
VoiceStream provided no maps, diagrams, or any type of assessment on 
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III. THE STAKES 
 
Each standard puts significantly different burdens on wireless 
providers, which has important implications for both consumers 
and providers. Wireless companies must provide services 
nationwide, as the twenty-first–century society is so mobile. A 
standard that varies by circuit, then, ultimately affects coverage 
among the circuits’ territory. 
Because providers have increased revenue in the mobile market 
by meeting this data-driven demand rather than by expanding 
traditional voice service, it is paramount that wireless providers 
keep up with consumer demands for ubiquitous high-speed 
wireless service.78 The current circuit split serves as an 
impediment to consumer access in certain areas of the country, 
while also affecting wireless service providers’ potential for 
growth. 
More generally, the telecommunications sector is a vital organ 
of the United States’ infrastructure, critical to national security and 
economic growth.79 For example, after the attacks of September 
11, 2001, wireless phones were central to national emergency 
planning.80  
The Chairman and CEO of AT&T urged the federal 
government to make wireless services a national priority and create 
a national model so that providers have a uniform standard to 
implement wireless infrastructure.81 President Obama’s 2013 
multiple-tower configurations as alternative sites . . . conclusory statements by 
the applicant, without more, are insufficient to establish that the applicant has 
exhausted thoroughly the possibility of other viable alternatives.”). 
78 See Rushton, supra note 78, (defining 4G as the fourth generation of 
mobile services that provides the fastest Internet speeds to date—speeds that are 
ten times faster than the previous 3G network).    
79 See Eagle, supra note 27, at 446. 
80 See Laura H. Phillips & Jason E. Friedrich, Wireless: Can Regulatory 
“Business as Usual” Continue?, COMM. LAW., (Fall 2002) at 12 (noting that on 
September 11, 2011 wireless phones were instrumental in reestablishing 
communication, consequently emphasizing for the government, companies, and 
families, the advantages of reliable, ubiquitous wireless coverage).  
81 Stephenson, supra  note 7, at A3 (“Establish a national model for the 
local approval process that’s required when wireless carriers need to build new 
mobile infrastructure.  The process needs to balance community concerns with 
the significant public benefit of adding new antennas and improving wireless 
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Budget Plan is premised on building an enduring economy atop a 
twenty-first century infrastructure, and this includes extending 
next-generation, wireless broadband to all parts of the country.82 
Just as roads and electricity helped build local economies and 
businesses decades ago, the ability for communities today to 
innovate and compete in the global economy is dependent on 
building the country’s wireless infrastructure.83 Because high-
speed wireless access is so widely relied upon, decisions to grant 
or deny proposals to construct or modify wireless towers have the 
potential for substantial impact.84 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the developed world, where people increasingly depend on 
mobile devices to fulfill some of the most mundane tasks, 
telecommunications companies are faced with a growing challenge 
to meet this demand. Society has a contradictory request: provide 
high-speed, ubiquitous coverage at all times, but keep unsightly 
and potentially dangerous facilities away. As a result, local 
governments often deny providers’ applications to build or modify 
facilities because of significant pushback from community 
coverage in local markets. Building our nation’s railroads and interstate highway 
system was made easier because Congress declared their construction a national 
priority and provided the policy framework to build them quickly. Our wireless 
infrastructure is every bit as critical to economic expansion.”).  
82 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office Of The President, An Economy 
Built to Last and a 21st Century Infrastructure (2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet/an-economy-built-to-last-and-a-21st-
century-infrastructure (last visited March 15, 2013) (stating that high speed, 
wireless broadband is a critical element to a growing, innovative economy).    
83 Justin Thiltgen, Wireless Broadband the Critical Infrastructure of the 21st 
Century, Telegraph Herald, Aug. 21, 2011, at A15, available at 
http://www.thonline.com/news/opinion/article_d864cafd-7fde-5383-9d05-
19708ad8e459.html?mode=image&photo=0 (“Farming is a competitive 
industry, just like any other, and farmers and ranchers need to have access to 
real-time updates to markets, prices and relevant news. They need to remotely 
monitor conditions and even use video for real-time observation. And because 
most farmers are out working in the field - not tied to an office - wireless 
broadband allows them to stay connected and do business from anywhere on 
their property.”). 
84 See id.  
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members. 
Under § 332(c)(7)(B), the TCA allows state or local authorities 
to deny a provider’s application to build, modify, or construct a 
wireless facility so long as it does not prohibit or have the effect of 
prohibiting wireless services. Because of the ambiguous nature of 
the provision, the circuits have split on how to interpret and apply 
the provision.  
The only way to resolve this split is to create a national 
standard so all national mobile providers have a uniform means for 
approaching the growing demand and local authorities have a 
standard to meet when reviewing new applications. Without such a 
standard, the TCA is being implemented incongruently, affecting 
both consumers and providers, and ultimately affecting the critical 
infrastructure that so many Americans rely upon for business, 
national security, innovation, and daily convenience.  Because 
Congress created a relatively ambiguous provision, the courts have 
confronted it unevenly on a case-by-case basis. The better solution 
would be for Congress or the FCC to amend the standard to 
provide clearer guidance in this crucial sector. 
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